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Cost Reduction and
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in the Small Business

To the reader
§ The profit margins of all businesses—large and small—have
been declining.
§ They were lower in 1958, according to many economists, than
at any time since 1945. Under the twin pressures of high taxes and
high costs, they may well decline again this year.
§ The ultimate survival of small business will depend in part
upon its readiness to adopt the techniques of modern management.
§ It can effectively use the tool of budgeting to increase profits.
This was the subject of the second bulletin in this current series
on management services by CPAs.
§ It should engage in sound financial planning—and obtain the
funds needed for growth—the subject of the third bulletin.
§ And it should constantly strive to reduce and control its costs.
This bulletin provides a review of some of the techniques of cost
reduction and control which can be applied most effectively in a
small business.
§ No one is better equipped than a CPA to advise the manage
ment of small business in improving its operations. In doing so,
he will not only expand his own opportunities for service, but will
contribute to the financial health of small business.

Cost Reduction and Cost Control
in the Small Business
Foreword
C ountless pages of accounting and management literature are
devoted to cost reduction and control.
Which cost controls can be of the greatest benefit to small
business?
This is not an easy question to answer. Some of the techniques
of reducing or controlling costs would be valuable to any business.
It is not the purpose of this bulletin, therefore, to imply priority
by virtue of its coverage.
The second bulletin in this series on management services by
CPAs, "Budgeting for Profit in Small Business,” covered one of the
more important cost control tools. In the opinion of many, it is
the most valuable over-all cost control tool available to any busi
ness. Many of the other cost control techniques, however, do not
have universal application. Some small businesses, for example,
could profit from the installation of a complete standard cost
system. Most of them would not. Nor could the majority justify
the cost or administer many of the other elaborate control tech
niques employed by big business.
This bulletin will be confined to two of the elements of cost
control: the development of formal cost reduction programs; and
the use of cost analysis. Both have considerable value for a high
percentage of small businesses. Both also involve techniques which
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are already familiar to most CPAs or in which they may become
competent quickly.
The orientation section of this bulletin (pp. 7 to 21) is con
cerned with the basic principles underlying a formal cost reduction
program, the benefits to be derived from it, and the approaches to
be used in establishing it in a small business.
The values and other end results of using cost analysis in the
management of the small business is the purpose of the illustrative
material (pp. 22 to 68). These illustrations of how CPAs have
advised managements of small clients—on the basis of simple cost
finding techniques—provide coverage of (1) distribution cost anal
ysis and the use of such data in management decision involving
small-order policy, and (2) direct variable product cost analysis
which, through use of the contribution concept, served to advise
management on marketing policy, product profitability and costs.
The final section of the bulletin (pp. 68 to 71) provides reference
or study material in the areas of cost reduction, cost accounting,
distribution cost accounting or cost analysis techniques.

6

A C O S T R E D U C T IO N P R O G R A M
IN T H E S M A L L B U S IN E S S

Most large companies have established cost reduction and cost
control programs on a formal basis. In the typical large company,
the planning and administration of a cost reduction program is
often assigned as a full-time responsibility to a top executive. Big
business has learned from experience that successful cost reduction
and control efforts must be applied continuously if full benefits
are to be obtained. Experience also proves that programmed cost
reduction in any business, large or small, must have one basic
element if it is to succeed. That element is leadership. It must be
spearheaded by an aggressive and imaginative leader.

The role o f the CPA
I n big business the leader, more often than not, is a financial man.
In the largest business the leader will function as a specialist in
this sphere alone; in larger businesses unable to justify specialists,
the controller is generally the leader. But who is to command the
attack on costs in a small business without a controller? The CPA
must do it. He is the best man to do it because of his intimate
knowledge of his client’s operations and because of his ability to
7

install the necessary standards, reports and controls. His inde
pendent status provides other tremendous advantages by which he
can assist a small business in reducing and controlling its costs.
1. He is a second pair of eyes which can often spot potential
cost saving areas or operations that management itself has taken
for granted for years.
2. The CPA can exert an independent pressure on management
for action which people within the organization would hesitate to
apply. He can discuss a trouble area critically and will build client
relations in doing so. Employees will often refrain from suggesting
changes that may step on the toes of co-workers. And who is to
blame them? They generally have nothing to gain, but much to
lose in their relationships.
3. The independent CPA can often function as a “lightning rod”
during the brief storms which occasionally follow the inauguration
of new procedures or policies. Smaller businesses are generally
intimate units, and explanations of the need for such changes can
often be made easier when they can be attributed to recommenda
tions made by the independent CPA. Management, for example,
may often act on the CPA’s proposal to share secretarial services
in order to eliminate, say, two of the private but only “prestige
building” secretaries of the four middle-management executives
of a small business.
4. Because of his wide experience in servicing many businesses,
he can bring the experience of one business to another.
The CPA, however, cannot do the job alone. No more so than
the program leader in the biggest business can “expert” the job.
Cost reduction is a team job. It is also a state of mind. The CPA
can only work with the small business management as the leader.
The creation of a favorable company atmosphere and the develop
ment of cost-consciousness down the line—these are tasks which
management itself must perform; but the CPA may have to show
them how arid guide them into cost reduction. Moving too fast
will often prove disastrous. A doctor will often spend a long time
in readying his patient for an operation. The CPA must set the
pace for management.
8

The obstacles in establishing
a cost reduction program
W hy do most small businesses pay little attention to formal cost
reduction programs?
There are many reasons—here are some:
1. It takes time to establish a program and even longer to achieve
results. The control and reduction of costs, the development of
a conducive company climate, the gradual inculcation of costconsciousness throughout the organization cannot be done over
night. Interest has often been lost in smaller companies before
their programs have had an opportunity to generate some tangible
benefits. This undoubtedly occurs in small business programs be
cause there is no leader who continually keeps the atmosphere
and program alive.
2. Current operations are satisfactory—complacency sets in. As
in big business, cost reduction is seldom taken seriously in smaller
businesses until sales or profit margins slip. Yet costs cannot be
trimmed any faster in periods of declining business than at any
other time. The lag in adjusting costs to lowered sales or margins
is not nearly so serious in the business that has continually been
practicing cost reduction formally.
3. Continual cost reduction strains the small business organiza
tion. It adds another burden to management that already has too
much to do and exerts a pressure on the employees. It involves
more work for everyone and cost investigation or operational
change sometimes results in disruption. Some managements ap
parently do not want to face up to these facts.
4. Tradition is often the largest obstacle to cost reduction in the
small business. Management generally accepts the fact that em
ployees do not like changes; but, managements are sometimes not
as aggressive and dynamic as they believe they are. They are
human, too, and the maintenance of the status quo provides a
feeling of security. After all, we’ve been doing it this way for years
—why gamble on a new way? The managers of a small business
9

who have developed the bad habit of operating by habit will
generally overlook many ways to save money. There is always a
better way of doing things. Tradition should often be cherished;
but it cannot be allowed to set the pace of business progress.
5. It costs too much to cut costs. The engagement of a consultant,
the addition of control reports, or addition of staff or supervision
—all logically appear, on the surface, to be additional expenses,
not reductions. Small business must be shown that it often takes
money to save money. It is the smart manager, for example, who
realizes that additional supervisory personnel may be required
when things get tough or that additional advertising money is best
spent when sales are falling. The successful management also rec
ognizes that capital additions will often contribute to a reduction
of costs.
6. Potential disruption of relations is another reason smaller
business does not adopt cost-saving techniques. The strain on
employee relations has already been mentioned; but union and
customer relations are often regarded even more as “touch-me-not”
areas. However, the experiences of others suggest that changes
in factory methods and procedures will not always violate the
“mechanical improvement” or “automation” clause in a union con
tract—nor are customers likely to be as distressed as it is feared
merely because the billing procedure is revised.
7. Cost-saving opportunities are rarely visible in the small busi
ness. A big business has expert cost accountants and industrial
engineers on its staff who, in spite of the operation’s complexity,
can detect high cost areas and do something about them. A small
business operation is rarely as complex as big business. A small
business management must be convinced that expensive cost re
ports and industrial engineering departments are not necessary in
the small business in order to locate and correct out-of-line costs.
Introduction or expansion of a simple accounting system, the estab
lishment of even informal standards of performance, and the de
velopment of a few basic reports drawn from the system is often
all that is required to provide the tools for a small business to
locate high cost operations, to reduce them, and then to keep
them in line.
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The CPA can help small business managements to recognize
these cost reduction barriers. None are insurmountable—particu
larly if management is aware of their existence. Many of them
are the result of inertia; but management itself is responsible for
some of them. It too often lacks the time or the financial informa
tion with which to launch an attack on costs. Small business
management can benefit greatly if the CPA will seize the initiative
in organizing a cost reduction and control program.

The major principles o f a successful
cost reduction program
Certain basic principles to be followed in a successful cost re
duction and control program have already been touched upon—
but due to the importance of avoiding pitfalls in going about cost
reduction the wrong way, the four major principles of programmed
cost reduction are listed.
1. Cost reduction cannot be a one-shot proposition. The crashprogram, initiated on the spur of the moment by management, is
rarely effective in the long run. And more often than not, the
crash-program will fall flat as soon as management has taken the
heat off. If it results in “cost reduction” due to across-the-board
cuts, the reductions are likely to be short-lived. The fat will creep
back in and “cost reduction” will have come to mean “fired” to
employees.
Optimum results can be achieved only if the cost reduction and
control are continuously practiced. It must become a state of mind
—a habit—with people, and cost-consciousness must be a part of
the daily operations of a small business. Cost reduction and control
must be everywhere within the business and individual cost-saving
efforts must be integrated with the over-all system of cost control.
2. Cost reduction and control is a team job. “Hogwash,” say the
autocratic, iron-fisted small business leaders—and perhaps some
CPAs agree with them. There is too much evidence to the contrary,
however, to accept any other point of view. Management is most
11

often defined as the art of getting things done through other people.
The area of cost reduction and control is no exception. Cost reduc
tions can only succeed through the co-ordinated efforts of all of a
company’s employees. While one individual must provide the
leadership in activating the program and keeping it alive, it will
be the ideas, activities and participation of the employees that will
prove to be of most benefit in cost reduction. In a small business
particularly, possible reductions in one area must be weighed
against the possibility of increased cost in other areas. The com
bined thinking of several people will furnish the best answer.
All of the employees—from the office boy to the president—must
be put on the cost reduction team. The most important employee
to enlist, however, is the foreman or supervisor. These are the
people who, through their own enthusiasm, can help instill the
proper cost-conscious climate throughout the business. In a small
business a few foremen and the office manager, for example, will
represent the first line of responsibility for the great majority of
operating costs. They work directly with the people who make the
product, waste the invoices, break the tools—and who can also
come up with the ideas for reducing the costs they generate. First
line supervisors must be sold on cost reduction and control first
as they, in turn, if they are good supervisors, will then sell other
employees on the importance of continual cost reduction. This
level of employee is also in the best position—the president or pro
gram leader having been considered—to follow up ideas and
changes to ensure that the cost reduction job is actually performed.
Selling cost consciousness is not always easy. The keys to success
are (1) the enthusiasm for cost reduction in the supervisory ranks
and (2) the ability of the supervisor and management to motivate
the other employees with their own enthusiasm and to enlist their
co-operation through financial and nonfinancial rewards.
This bulletin cannot delve deeply into techniques of employee
motivation, but it is so important that the employees be brought
into the cost reduction and control program that a few of the basics
might well be mentioned. The CPA need not be an expert on em
ployee relations to determine if the personnel practices of his small
business client are fostering sound employee attitudes—which, in
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turn, are conducive to cost reduction and control. A CPA is gen
erally aware of the employee attitudes of his clients. If this aspect
of the company’s environment appears to be discouraging em
ployee participation in cost reduction, the CPA may be the logical
man to alert management to the situation and perhaps to advise
action that will correct the climate and motivate the personnel to
orient themselves to the needs of management. The ranks must
be made up of employees who want what the boss wants. A strictly
“nine-to-five” attitude on the part of the majority of a small com
pany’s employees is a dangerous condition. If a few employees are
locker-room lawyers—chronically unhappy and unco-operative—
there is no real problem. They can be fired—or put out of harm’s
way, if complete elimination is precluded. However, when the
majority of the employees of a small business do not identify them
selves with the objectives of management, the company will have
lost its most valuable allies in the battle to reduce and control costs.
The causes of such a condition should not be difficult to uncover.
Look at the financial incentive first. Seek the answers to a few
basic questions:
a. Are the company s salaries and wage rates competitive with
those paid by similar businesses in the community? How long has
it been since comparisons of rates were made to formal or informal
surveys of wages and fringe benefits offered by similar businesses
in the area? Experience dictates that an underpaid worker will
often cost the company even more than the going rate as a result
of his disgruntled attitude and lack of initiative. If low salaries and
wage rates have created an excessive turnover rate, the cost of
continual rehiring and retraining, in itself, may cost more than a
few cents per hour across-the-board which would correct the
situation.
b. Are jobs alike in skill and importance paid in the same range?
Has management ever evaluated jobs, objectively—even informally
—so that higher wages are paid for more difficult jobs? Or has time
resulted in salary favoritism or too many red circle rates, based
solely on seniority? If jobs have been evaluated, do the employees
understand it? And do they know when they will be evaluated
again, if their jobs change?
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c. Are there financial incentives that extend beyond base pay?
Any group of employees, each of which is capable of a different
quantity of output, is likely to maintain a common level of produc
tion, in the absence of individual incentive. The level will generally
be close to the production rate of the low producers. A wage in
centive system will provide the better employee with the opportu
nity he wants: to relate his superior abilities to a superior pay check.
d. Are there financial incentives that specifically promote cost
reduction? Has a suggestion program or other formal means of
rewarding active participation in cost reduction been established?
Most large businesses have set up formal mechanics to satisfy this
need—and it is safe to say that an overwhelming majority have
profited by doing so.
While it is well established that people are motivated quite
effectively by money, this is never all that is required. There are
many nonfinancial factors that seriously influence employee at
titudes, and which are necessary to satisfy the emotional needs of
employees. Any lengthy discussion of these nonfinancial factors
would contribute nothing further to the point being made here:
that the small business must develop a positive attitude on the
part of its employees. As an adviser on cost reduction to a small
business management, the CPA can help by stressing the basic
definition of management—the art of getting things done through
other people. Cost reduction efforts will never be fully effective
without the support of people.
3. Another important principle in cost reduction is the recogni
tion that cost saving possibilities are available throughout the small
business. In smaller businesses where failures stem preponderantly
from deficiencies in management, this is particularly significant.
Cost control and efforts at cost reduction should encompass the
entire business. The experience of big business has proved that cost
savings can be effected almost everywhere. The economies may not
be achieved immediately, but sooner or later the costs generated
in any area can be reduced—but only if that area is covered in
the program.
4. Costs can be effectively reduced and controlled only if a small
14

business has adequate cost information. A profit and loss statement,
with the usual schedules of expenses, is rarely enough—although
in some small businesses even these can provide a start. It is here
that the CPA can probably make his largest single contribution to
management. Through his knowledge of his small business client’s
operations and his understanding of its management, their atti
tudes, strengths, weaknesses, and needs, he can best assist in
providing this necessary element of cost control. Each client’s
needs, as well as the accounting and reporting methods to be
utilized in the circumstances, may be different. The CPA must
evaluate this in each case in order that the management receive
adequate information about its costs. The reports of cost activity,
moreover, must be oriented to the needs of the man directly re
sponsible for the costs. This often calls for a change of thinking on
the part of a small business management—or a CPA—who thinks
only of directors and stockholders when preparing reports.
Only by observing these four interlocking principles can a cost
reduction and control program be effectively introduced and
utilized in a small business.
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W H A T IS T H E A P P R O A C H T O P R O G R A M M E D C O S T
R E D U C T IO N A N D C O N T R O L ?
H O W D O E S A S M A L L B U S IN E S S G E T S T A R T E D ?

Suppose that a CPA has helped a small business management to
become convinced of the advantages of a formal and continuous
effort to reduce and control costs. The CPA, in turn, is satisfied
that management will back the program; that company climate
does not appear to be a roadblock to getting started and that the
general accounting records are adequately maintained. In other
words, the necessary elements on which to build a sound program
are present.
Where does the small business go from there? How should the
problem be approached? Where can efforts at reduction and con
trol be most effectively concentrated? Most small businesses would
be doing a better job of controlling costs if they knew the answers
to these questions. Unfortunately, there is no pat answer, as the
individual circumstances of each small business are different; but
the experience of others does provide some worth-while rules
which can be applied to almost any set of conditions.
One businessman has made this observation, facetiously or
acidly: “Business has been told how to approach the subject
stealthily and from the flanks, how to approach it boldly and head
on, how to approach it with money, how to approach it without
money, how to approach it with a complex system, or no system at
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all. How to cut costs with the left hand, how to cut them with the
right hand and even how to cut them with no hands at all.” W ith so
many different means to accomplish the same end available to
him, this man could not understand why determined small business
people (like himself, perhaps) found it so difficult to cut and con
trol costs.
Cost control specialists are continually discovering “new” and
“different” approaches. They have passed through the mere “or
ganized,” “tested,” “practical,” or “dynamic” approaches and cur
rently will not settle for anything less than “systems engineering,”
“integrated standardization,” or some equally sophisticated method
for getting and keeping costs down.
“Systems engineering,” or what have you, is not necessary in the
small business. On the contrary, there is a definite need for sim
plicity and, to be practical, the cost control process cannot be too
costly. For the small business even if it is unable to “engineer” new
systems or cannot afford large investments, progress can still be
made. Based on successful experience, this is how cost reduction
ought to be approached and where it may be best concentrated in
the small business.
1. Plan the entire program carefully before starting to work the
plan. A timetable of anticipated goals should be developed in order
to avoid discouragement over what may appear to be slow progress.
It should also be recognized at the outset that the time needed to
effect an adequate control system depends largely on how much
control already exists in the business. If a small business can build
on good records, and perhaps on some basic budgeting as simple
performance standards, results should appear quickly. If there is
little or no control at the start it is going to take a lot more time.
This fact should be accepted in the beginning; then program the
goals and only insist, in starting out, that some progress be shown
constantly.
2. Preplan which elements of cost are to bear concentration
first. A small business cannot work effectively on all of its cost
elements and cost areas at the same time. An element or area
should be selected where savings can most likely be effected. The
results will then stimulate the program. There is generally little to
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be accomplished by “turning out lights.” Time and material are
ordinarily the two elements of cost which should bear the brunt of
the attack. As a rule, concentration on these elements will produce
the best results.
3. Break the business into activity areas—and then develop a
plan of priority. Select an activity area in which to start—just o n e keeping in mind that an initial success will make it easier to achieve
results in the next area. How is the first activity area to be selected?
Experience provides a few hints:
( a ) Look for a bottleneck area—one where everything is always
wrong, or where people are constantly chasing around the organi
zation expediting everything in sight.
(b ) If the small business is fortunately free of such an area, look
for one in which things have been done the same way for the
longest time. This is often ripe for immediate cost saving, as its
methods and procedures which have been taken for granted for
years are often screaming for change.
( c ) Make sure the first area to be attacked is generating enough
costs to justify its selection. In other words, it is an obvious error
to announce the new cost program with a great fanfare and then
proceed to “work simplify” the office boy’s job because he’s “always
chasing around” and mail deliveries have been made via the same
route for years. Show the employees that you’re dead serious. They
will, in turn, take the program seriously, and it will help to foster
their participation.
4. Having established a list of priorities and having selected the
first area to be studied, what is to be done next? These are the steps:
(a) L et the employees know what’s going on and get them into
the act. Don’t try to “expert” the job.
(b ) Get the facts—analyze the area. Find out what is going on,
and why things are done as they are. Determine to what extent
the area is presently being controlled.
(c) On the basis of the facts, decide what procedures can best
be utilized for reducing and controlling the costs in the area. W hat
control methods will contribute to increased productivity or control
of material usage? In the small business, as in the large, no magic
formula is available for determining a control procedure which
18

can be used in all cases or in all areas. The procedure for adequate
control of costs in the area will rarely be found to lie altogether in
a revision of the accounting system or reports. Control of labor cost,
for example, might not only require the introduction of time
standards; it might also require better procedure for control of
employee selection or training. Control of the manpower must also
provide for a continual review of what is being done, how it is being
done, and who is doing it. To summarize, only by obtaining and
analyzing all the facts can the appropriate control procedures be
established.
(d ) Set up the tools for analysis and control. The basic tech
nique of cost control in any business involves a comparison of actual
operations with standards through cost reports. This basic defini
tion of cost control may in itself be a reason small businesses do
nothing about controlling costs. The definition is probably inter
preted, erroneously, to mean that an expensive cost accounting
system must be installed, only after establishing standards through
time studies conducted by high-priced engineering experts. If a
small company can afford these luxuries of cost control, it will
probably do a better job. But, they are by no means necessary in
the average small company. It needs only standards and reports.
The reporting aspect of the control procedure should pose few
problems to the CPA. It is the establishment of "standards” or
other “measures of performance” that appear to raise questions.
It is often thought to be a task reserved solely for engineers. This
may be true at General Motors; but the formulation of standards is
complex only to the extent that the business is complex—and small
businesses are rarely complex.
Standards can be effectively established in any division of the
business—production, sales, the office—on the basis of observation,
historical records or simply informed judgment. Standards set in
this manner will be a valuable beginning. Like budgets, they will
become better. They may at first serve only as an over-all means
of measurement with which to evaluate the variances in an entire
month’s operations in a single activity area. However, as the stand
ards are refined in that area and expanded to include other areas,
the reports can start to disclose the effects of efficiency or changes
19

in prices or volume. They may ultimately form the basis of a com
plete standard cost accounting system. The important thing is
that a small business must have basic standards of measurement.
Every business, of course, has standards; but they are not always
standards for measurement. In fact, in many businesses, managed
by default, the work standards are set by the employees themselves.
Because of this the setting of formal standards in some companies
may call for changes in the work habits of employees. They would
be less than human if they did not resent the idea of being con
trolled. Consequently, any changes made in the first activity area
should be simple—and make sure no one in the area is hurt by the
changes or by the introduction of standards. More changes and
tighter standards can be adopted later. Handled right, the em
ployees will help to make them.
(e) Set up the reports for analysis and control. The other tool
of the cost control checkup is the report by which the activity area
can now be watched and improved. Experience of others in this
phase of cost control points up the need to recognize that it is not
the stockholders nor even the officers of a business that primarily
control the activity areas. The foreman or supervisor is the first
line of responsibility, and the reporting process must be geared to
his needs. Keep the reports simple in design and content. If pos
sible, the foreman’s own ideas on presentation should be accepted.
The internal cost report is probably the most valuable instrument
of control. They must be informative and understandable to the
people who bear the responsibility for the costs being reported.
In planning new or revising old reports for each activity area,
it is also important to consider the accounting procedures and
records from which the reports are to be prepared. Does the system
of obtaining the basic operational data require revision? Will the
preparation of reports be simple, or will their preparation and the
recording of the data in the general records require two distinct
analyses of the operating data? Should the reports tie in to the
general records? A tie-in is generally held to be desirable, but a
CPA will have to evaluate the necessity in each case. In short, the
whole record-keeping function must be reviewed.
These are the steps which, taken together, represent a successful
20

approach to cost reduction and control in the small business.
If the CPA doesn’t guide small business clients through the
steps outlined and get them started on a formal program for
reducing and controlling their costs, there is reason to wonder who
else ever will.
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A N IL L U S T R A T IO N O F H O W A C P A ’S A N A L Y S IS O F
D IS T R IB U T IO N

COSTS

A S S IS T E D

M ANAGEM ENT

D E C IS IO N IN E S T A B L IS H IN G S M A L L A N D M IN IM U M
O R D E R P O L IC IE S O F A S M A L L B U S IN E S S

History o f the company
I n 1947 O tto Mason, then working as a supervisor in the meat
department of a supermarket, purchased an old truck and a failing
meat provision route from the widow of a friend. Ten years later
he had added a fourth truck to his "fleet” and ranked as one of the
city’s larger independent meat distributors. Otto’s customary work
day called for arrival at the market about 5 a.m . to purchase the
items required for each day’s deliveries and supervise the loading
of his trucks. He often made the deliveries himself when any of
his route men did not report for work. If he wasn’t driving, he
would spend most of his day soliciting prospective accounts. He
would return to his small office late in the afternoon, check the
day’s “weights” and compile orders received from his regular
customers for delivery the following day. This usually kept him
busy until 10 p .m . His consistent 14 or 15-hour days, however, were
not for naught. They paid off handsomely.
As an "independent,” Otto supplied a complete line of meat
products required to service butcher shops and restaurants. He
was happy to fill an order for any grade of meat, but he catered
22

primarily to customers desiring prime beef and meat products. The
key to his success lay in his ability to select the best meat available
in each grade in the open market for his customers, and in gross
profit margins. The entire sales mix produced an average gross
margin of about 7 per cent, and Otto had learned long ago that the
best way to get the extra “point” consistently was to handle the
higher quality grades where market price fluctuation was not as
extreme as it was with the lower grade products.
Otto had first engaged a CPA about a year after he had been in
business. The CPA prepared monthly financial statements, and
spent a couple of hours with Otto each month discussing “business
in general.” Otto seemingly saved up his ideas and his less urgent
problems for these monthly conferences with his CPA. After a
brief review of the financial statements, they would discuss each
one of them. It was more than a business relationship. They had
become good friends.
The CPA had submitted separate bills for a good deal of special
work that he had done for Otto in the past. Otto, like most shrewd
businessmen, was receptive to new ideas, and was always willing
to make an investment—if the cost stood more than an even chance
of helping to produce additional profits. Otto was even incensed
when he didn’t receive a bill from the CPA for suggesting a simple
idea that involved the use of a tape recording telephone answering
system and arranging for its installation. Otto had thought it ab
solutely ingenious that any of his 500 customers could dial a number
and have a tape record their routine orders. The installation of this
automatic telephone equipment had already eliminated hundreds
of hours of time which Otto and his part-time assistants would have
spent taking orders over the phone.

The problem o f specialty orders
T he early 1959 monthly sessions found one problem area con
tinually coming up. Somewhere along the line, Otto had gradually
started to service delicatessens, small restaurants and luncheon
ettes. He was now servicing over 250 of these smaller customers
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on what he called a “specialty order” basis only. Otto had regularly
supplied specialty items (such as cold cuts and private brand
packaged m eats) in addition to his principal beef and pork lines,
to his major customers.
He had found that delicatessens and other smaller retailers were
simple to sell. The national meat packers and most of the “inde
pendents” in the area were not interested in servicing delicatessens
and luncheonettes; but Otto had felt that these stops were worth
while as long as they were on his customary routes. This type of
business had originally been confined to small stops near one of
his larger customers, but now the stops had become more scattered.
Another factor had led to the acquisition of a number of these
accounts: a commission arrangement which Otto had with his
drivers. This, too, had been thrashed out with the CPA a few years
ago. In addition to a basic salary, the drivers received a one-half
of 1 per cent commission on beef, pork and other heavy items and
1 per cent on specialties. Otto installed this system as a “service
incentive.” When the plan was being installed, the CPA admits
that he had not been altogether convinced of its merits; but he had
been wrong. It had been extremely successful in stimulating the
drivers to retain and expand existing accounts and to seek new ones.
Many of the smaller accounts had been acquired through brief
sales calls which the drivers had made when time permitted.
Did it pay to make these small order stops? As Otto talked about
it, he became increasingly certain that he was losing money by
servicing them. Many of his competitors had apparently come to
this conclusion long ago.
He agreed with the CPA, however, that there were other con
siderations. The service of these small customers had often led to
referral to larger accounts. Moreover, most of the stops were ser
viced on “off” days. The majority of the heavy beef and pork
deliveries were made on Wednesday and Thursday, in order to
stock the larger customers for their week-end trade. Deliveries
were moderate on other days. It was on these days that most of
the small order stops were made. Otto thought, however, that if
he were to cut out all small orders, he might be able to eliminate
one driver and a truck—although this might create a tight schedul
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ing problem. The CPA had pointed out that this might restrict
Otto’s ability to service new accounts and that eventually the
fourth driver and truck might be necessary in any event—if the
business continued to grow. As the conference continued, it be
came obvious that more facts were needed for a sound decision
on whether to eliminate some or all of the specialty stops, or at
least to establish a minimum order.

Three basic problems
As soon as he was able to delve into the situation, the CPA quickly
found three problems facing him.
1. He would probably not be able to separate the costs and other
data on the specialty stops from the regular business with any
degree of precision. He did establish, however, that most of the
required data would be available and accurate. By introducing a
few logical assumptions, he would be able to fill in the areas where
exact data were lacking.
2. Discussions with Otto and one of the experienced drivers
revealed contradictory estimates of delivery times, distances
between stops, etc. This could be settled. The CPA arranged to
have a staff assistant accompany one of the city route drivers the
following Monday and a suburban route driver on Tuesday. He
would collect his own data through observation of a normal de
livery day on which a representative number of small order stops
would be made.
3. While all the information on costs and sales could be ex
tracted, it would require too much time of Otto’s bookkeeper. The
CPA solved this problem by arranging to have one of his office
girls and Otto’s daughter, who attended college in the morning but
had afternoons free, do the necessary detail in the CPA’s office.
Most of the analysis work would be quite simple.
It was two weeks before the CPA received enough data from his
assistants to work up the distribution costs. He had been reason
ably confident that cost analysis for a three-month period would
prove adequate and accurate. Only in the event certain estimates
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could not reasonably be made did he feel further analysis would
have to be made.
He first prepared a schedule of gross profit margins on specialty
products from the analysis of vendors’ and customers’ invoices.
SCHEDULE I
Gross Profit Margins
Specialty Product Lines

Product Group

Gross Profit
Rate for
Three Months
E nded 3 /3 1 /5 9

Specialty beefs and h a m s .............. .
Cold cuts—g e n e ra l........................
Barrel products—(pigs feet, e tc .). .
Private brand packaged goods
(bacon, hot dogs, e t c . ) ............

%of All Specialty
Sales, Based on
Three M onths
E nded 3 /3 1 /5 9

12.12%
11.04%
14.23%

19.54%
20.32%
14.71%

9.62%

45.43%
100.00%

He pondered whether he should use an average gross profit rate
for purposes of his study, but decided that while it was possible
to weigh the average by the sales volume of each item for a threemonth period, it would have to be adjusted for seasonal sales varia
tions. It made more sense, in any case, to use the lowest rate of
gross profit in order to keep the calculations of order profitability
and minimum order or break-even sale on a conservative basis.
The CPA then prepared a schedule of the variable costs—the
costs which varied in direct proportion to the sales value of the
order. By applying these marginal costs to gross profit margins,
he arrived at an adjusted gross profit rate. He computed a rate for
other than specialty items for information purposes only. It was
not pertinent to the distribution cost study of the specialty stops.
The spoilage and shrinkage allowance was estimated in conver
sation with Otto. No records had ever been maintained on this loss.
The delivery cost data from which he prepared his next calcula
tions and schedule again contained a few estimates he worked out
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with Otto. Miles driven, per truck speedometers, for example, were
adjusted for miles driven to and from the market each day. The
tire expense had to be estimated because the three-month expense
recorded in the books for tires did not prove to be representative.
Data on stops made were disclosed by a count of delivery tickets
and the rest of the information in the schedule had been obtained
directly from analysis of records. The delivery cost data repre
sented the elements of expense that varied in proportion to the
length of time required to make delivery and collect the proceeds.
The CPA then reviewed his staff man’s observations. There was
a reasonably significant difference in miles traveled between stops
on the different routes (as he suspected), but the difference in
sales value per stop on each of the routes bothered him. He ques
tioned the accuracy of the figures. Further conversation with Otto,
however, established the reasonableness of the fact that suburban
stops were generally larger in value than city stops. Suppliers of
packaged meat specialties serviced smaller customers in the city,
but most did not venture into the subtubs to drop off typical orders
of say twenty pounds of bacon. Otto’s small customers in the
subtubs, therefore, generally purchased more specialty items from
him than their city counterparts. With the assurance that the data
SCHEDULE H
Calculation of Adjusted Gross Profit
Available to Cover Variable Delivery Costs

Gross profit r a t e ..............................................
Less selling expenses which vary in proportion
to the dollar value of the order:
Driver’s commission................................
Cash d isco u n t..........................................
Spoilage and shrinkage allow ance........
Adjusted gross p ro f it......................................

Specialty
Products

Other
Products

9.62%

6.37%

1.00%
.50%
1.00%

.50%
—
1.50%

2.50%

2.00%

7.12%

4.37%
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were representative, the CPA scheduled the facts disclosed from
observation of the drivers.
SCHEDULE III
Delivery Cost Data
Based on Three Months Ended March 3 1 , 1959
Miles d riv e n ..............................................................
Stops made—T o ta l....................................................
—Specialty stops o n ly ..........................
Value of deliveries—T o ta l........................................
—Specialty stops o n ly ................
Truck costs:
Variable costs:
Gas and o i l ....................................................
T ir e s ............................................................
R ep airs........................................................

21,750
6,400
2,650
$334,000.00
47,200.00

$

903.00
165.00
273.00

Total variable co sts......................
Fixed costs (licenses, insurance, depreciation)

$ 1,341.00
745.00

Total truck c o sts ..........................

$ 2,086.00

Driver costs:
Salaries..................................................................
Miscellaneous ....................................................

$ 3,735.00
198.00

Total driver c o s ts ........................

$ 3,933.00

Total delivery co sts......................

$ 6,019.00

Analysis
Miles driven between stops—(all s to p s ) ................
Value of deliveries per stop—(all s to p s ) ................
Value of deliveries per mile—(all stops) ................
Value of deliveries per stop—(specialty stops only)
Variable truck costs per m ile ....................................
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3.4 miles
$52.19
$15.35
$17.81
.062

SCHEDULE IV
Observation of Delivery Procedure
City Route

Estimated allocation of driver’s time:
Driving between s to p s ..................
Delivering and collecting............
Assisting display and delay tim e.,

Suburban Route

20%
55%
25%

35%
35%
30%

100%

100%

58
Miles d riv e n .......................................
24
Stops—(all s to p s ) .............................
9
Stops—(specialty o n l y ) ..................
Dollar value of deliveries—total. . . . . $1,087
Dollar value of deliveries—
specialty o n l y .............................. . .$ 124

82
16
7
$1,042
$ 136

Analysis
Miles driven between stops—
( all stops) ......................................
Miles driven between stops—
(specialty only)—per observation.
Sales per delivery—(all sto p s)..........
Sales per delivery—(specialty only)

2.4

5.1

2.7
$45.29
$13.77

4.8
$65.13
$19.43

The junior accountant had timed each delivery and found that
a typical specialty stop required 12½ minutes. This initially seemed
too long to the CPA, but the junior stuck to his guns. He explained
that the delays in waiting for payment while customers were waited
on, showcase rearrangement, which was part of the service, plus
time just passing the time of day with the proprietor took this long.
As a matter of fact, the junior suspected that the drivers, conscious
of his presence, had worked a little faster than they might ordi
narily, even though they had been told to assume he wasn’t there.
The CPA was convinced. He used an average time of 15 minutes
per stop to stay on the conservative side.
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The CPA included a schedule of computed base wage rates only
so subsequent schedules would be appropriately supported. Com
missions, of course, were paid in addition after the drivers them
selves computed what was due them at the end of each week. Otto
rarely checked their computations and didn’t want the CPA to do
so either. It was his expression of good faith to his employees. Not
the best of internal control, but the CPA is as sure as Otto that this
practice has made a good deal more money than it has lost. Otto
feels, too, that it puts the drivers in closer contact with the dollar
activity for each customer.
SCHEDULE V
Schedule of Wage Rates
Based on Standard 40-Hour Week
City Routes—# 1 ........................................................................ $1.85
—# 2 ........................................................................ 1.82
Suburban Routes—# 1 ................................................................
—# 2 ..............................................................

1.75
1.72

Average—all ro u te s .................................................................. 1.78
Average—city ro u te s .................................................................. 1.83
Average—suburban r o u te s ........................................................ 1.73
The CPA’s next calculation was a summation of all of the distri
bution cost data contained in his first five schedules. This was the
heart of his report to Otto. Once again he was obliged to proceed
on the basis of an assumption, as disclosed in Note A; but he could
not see that this would materially affect the validity of his con
clusions. He wanted, throughout the study, to keep it conservative.
Even before the CPA computed the minimum specialty order
required to break even, he could see that specialty stops were con
tributing to profits. He prepared his schedule after making a few
simple calculations.
He wondered if he should chart this. He was sure he could
show the same data on a simple break-even chart, but remembering
the time he confused Otto with what he had thought was a mag
nificent graphic portrayal of comparative gross profits by months
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SCHEDULE VI
Variable Delivery Costs
Per Specialty Stop
City
Routes

Suburban
Routes

10 min. 10 min.
$1.78
$1.83

10 min.
$1.73

6.2¢

6.2¢

6.2¢

3.7

2.7

4.8

29.7¢

30.5¢

28.8¢

22.9¢

16.7¢

29.8¢

52.6¢

47.2¢

58.6¢

26.3¢
26.3¢

23.6¢
23.6¢

29.3¢
29.3¢

All
Routes

Marginal delivery costs which
vary in proportion to distance
between stops:
Estimated driving time
between s to p s........................
Wages per hour—Schedule V . . .
Truck costs per mile—
Schedule I I I ............................
Miles between specialty stops—
Schedules III and IV—Note A
Total variable driving time
cost, per s to p ..........................
Total variable truck cost
per s t o p ..................................
T o ta l............................................
Less 50% allowance for “on
route” stops—Note A ..............
Marginal delivery costs which vary
in proportion to length of time
for driver to deliver order and
collect payment:
Wages, per hour—Schedule V ..
Estimated delivery tim e ..........
Total cost per s to p ......................
Total variable delivery cost
per s t o p ..........................................

$1.78
$1.83
15 min. 15 min.
44.50
45.70 70.8¢

69.3¢

$1.73
15 min.
43.20
72.5¢

Note A appears on page 32.
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SCHEDULE VII
Minimum Order Calculation
Specialty Stops
All
Routes

City
Routes

Suburban
Routes

Gross profit available to cover
all c o sts ......................................

9.62%

9.62%

9.62%

Less:
Marginal selling expenses
which vary in proportion
to dollar value of the order

2.50%

2.50%

2.50%

7.12%

7.12%

7.12%

Adjusted gross profit—Schedule I
Variable delivery costs—
Schedule VI—Note B ................
Minimum specialty order to
break e v e n ................................

70.8¢

69.3¢

72.5¢

$ 9.94

$ 9.73

$10.18

Average specialty order—
Schedules III and I V ................

$17.81

$13.77

$19.43

Note A: It is estimated, based on the observation of deliveries, that half of
the specialty stops are on-route, half off-route. A 50 per cent allowance,
therefore, has been made in order to eliminate from consideration the costs
of variable truck cost and drivers’ time for on-route stops that would be
incurred anyway.
The number of miles between stops on all routes has been computed to be
the average of the city route mileage of 2.7 and suburban route mileage of
4.8, as determined from the observation of delivery procedures.
Note B: The variable delivery cost computations assume that only half of the
specialty stops are off-route and, accordingly, only 50 per cent of the variable
truck and driving time expenses were included in variable delivery costs. The
off-route stops themselves, which incur 100 per cent of the variable delivery
cost, or 97.1¢ (70.80 plus 50 per cent allowance of 26.3¢) for all routes,
92.9 ¢ for city routes and 101.8¢ for suburban routes, would require a mini
mum order to break even of $13.64, $13.05 and $14.29, respectively, all of
which are below the average specialty order presently being handled.
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for a four-year period, he decided the schedule was enough.
The report settled the entire issue. The CPA recommended that
a hard-and-fast minimum order rule should not be established, but
that new or existing specialty accounts which often purchased less
than the computed minimum break-even order should be con
tinually re-examined. A distribution cost analysis, he cautioned,
should be made periodically in the future, as the picture would
always be subject to change as costs and distribution patterns
changed. Although the CPA recommended that no minimum order
be established and that service of additional small accounts was
desirable, he was careful to point out that the principal sales con
centration should continue to be directed toward large orders and
the regular line of business. Sales at the minimum order level, he
explained, are only desirable in that they produce marginal profits
and contribute to fixed expenses.
The lack of organized competition had probably been due to
the fact that Otto’s competitors had long ago come to the conclu
sion that the cost to distribute to these small customers prohibited
even a reasonable contribution to overhead, let alone the making
of a small profit. The cost analysis had disclosed that Otto was
actually in an enviable marketing position. The analysis had per
haps pointed up a few things his competitors did not know.
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A N IL L U S T R A T IO N O F H O W A C P A A D V IS E D A
S M A L L B U S IN E S S M A N A G E M E N T O N IT S C O S T S ,
P R IC IN G , A N D S A L E S P O L IC IE S T H R O U G H
A N A L Y S IS O F P R IC E S A N D A D IR E C T P R O D U C T
COST STUDY

F or the benefit of the reader with limited time, this lengthy
illustration has been divided into three sections. The first section
provides general background on the company; it can be reviewed
quickly. Section II represents the first part of the CPA’s report and
covers his recommendations for changing or strengthening pricing
and marketing policies. The final section represents the second half
of the CPA’s report and deals with his direct costing study and his
application of such data under the contribution concept to an
analysis of product profitability. Either of these sections can be
read independently of the other.

SECTION I

History o f the company
T he W ahoo Building Supply C ompany had been adjudicated
bankrupt in July 1958, had continued its operations as a debtor
in possession and had come out of the bankruptcy proceedings
in November 1958.
At the time of this bankruptcy, Wahoo had been in business for
approximately nine years. It was formed in the late 1940’s by three
former salesmen of a national building supply firm. The three men
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had serviced the local market for several years and were familiar
with the jobbers, distributors and contractors operating in the area.
Pooling their resources, they had bought the machinery, equip
ment, brand name and other related assets of a division of a large
manufacturer of building supplies which wanted to divest itself
of the manufacture and sale of overhead garage doors. The new
owners were able to retain many of the employees of the division
so that the manufacturing aspects of the business with which they
were unfamiliar had been left in capable hands.
During the heavy home construction years of the late 1940’s in
Wahoo’s market area, additional sales volume was quickly built
and the sales-oriented management was able to show profits. Profits,
however, were never substantial. The operation turned into a break
even during the early 1950’s and then slipped to losses in 1955,
1956 and 1957. Even during the loss years, the sales volume con
tinued to increase. Although the owners knew that the company
had been operating at small losses, they were still astounded to
find themselves suddenly confronted with bankruptcy.
They were able to continue their operation through the bank
ruptcy proceedings and settlement primarily because of a large
loan from a private investor. The sympathetic investor was a suc
cessful contractor to whom some favor had been granted in the
past when shortages in building supplies had occurred. He was
also fond of the three members of management and sufficiently
impressed by their sincerity that he agreed to advance them
$75,000 to effect a partial settlement. W ith this loan and arrange
ments with a factor for the financing of their receivables, they were
able to maintain enough working capital to overcome their weak
credit position.

Retention o f the CPA and company
operations after the bankruptcy
W ahoo had never retained a CPA. The entire accounting staff
had consisted of a bookkeeper and a clerical assistant, who from
time to time (usually twice a year) prepared basic financial state
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ments. The managers’ first meeting with the CPA had occurred
during the bankruptcy proceedings. They had been impressed
with his manner and his speed in preparing financial statements.
He was engaged when, as a condition of his loan, the friendly
investor demanded monthly financial reports which had been re
viewed by a CPA.
The management explained to the CPA that present budget
restrictions would require that he spend a minimum of time on
the engagement. He was authorized only to assist a young and
recently hired accountant in preparing income statements and
balance sheets and in reviewing the books for “significant errors.”
The owners hoped that, as a result of this inexpensive arrangement,
the friendly investor would remain friendly.
Dividing his hourly standard rates into the fixed fee allotted
would have permitted the CPA to allot about four hours to the
job each month. During the early months of 1959, he averaged
twice that number. The extra time was spent in coaching the young
accountant and in exploring several matters which—although out
side the scope of his engagement—he felt obliged to check over.
It had been impossible for him to probe much beyond the surface
of the records even though the management apparently regarded
him as a financial wizard capable of deciphering a set of statements,
books and monthly entries at a single glance. They had insisted,
in view of the investor’s demands, that he perform the work per
sonally. He had received constant calls from the young accountant
and had held two rather lengthy conferences with the investor. At
this point he wondered whether the arrangements were beneficial
to either his client or himself.
The investor became apprehensive after reviewing the second
set of statements with the CPA—and his concern increased on
receiving the statements for the third month. All of the statements
had shown small operating losses. The CPA had been authorized
by management to discuss the statements with the investor; but
he had been embarrassed when he found that he could not answer
some of the investor’s questions. The investor understood, how
ever, that the CPA could not be expected to have an intimate
knowledge of the operations in view of the terms of his engage
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ment. While both the CPA and the investor were unable to put
their finger on all the specific reasons why the business was not
operating profitably, they were agreed the cause lay somewhere
in the price-cost relationships—which, of course, the financial state
ments could not disclose.
The managers had looked at the monthly statements and were
honestly surprised that the company was continuing to operate at
a loss, particularly during a good selling season. They were confi
dent that the problem could be solved by increased sales. Before
they really reviewed the financial statements completely, they
would get their hats and go out to raise sales volume which, as
terrific salesmen, they always seemed to be able to do.

Company organization and products
E ach of the three owners served as a "regional” sales manager,
and each had three salesmen working for him in each of nine
"districts.” The principal products sold were a line of overhead
garage doors, all of which were manufactured under the direction
of the factory manager. They also sold accessories such as doortrack and items related to the installation of the doors, which for
the most part were also manufactured by Wahoo. In addition, the
company sold and manufactured a small line of aluminum and
wood awnings which had been gaining favor. Some revenue was
received from garage door installation and service work, but it
was the policy of the company to avoid this type of work, if pos
sible. Most of this work was performed for home owners who
found installation on a do-it-yourself basis (which was the way the
doors were advertised and sold to this type of customer) a bit
risky after reading the installation instructions.
Wahoo still carried and occasionally sold a bit of aluminum
ivy. This product was the brainstorm of one of the owners who was
sure the aluminum scrap could be more profitably salvaged by
punching ivy leaves from it, “greening” them through an electro
lytic process, and attaching them to wires or mesh frames. The
idea, apparently, was to sell the ivy to young buyers of new homes
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who had promised their brides ivy-covered cottages. Unfortunately,
young brides had proved to be considerably more practical than
the idea.

The company’s markets
Sales dollars were derived roughly as follows:
Garage doors and accessories.................... 75%
Awnings and “ivy” ...................................... 15%
Installation and serv ice.............................. 10%
The distribution channels were mainly through outlets which
served the builders of single or multiple housing construction. The
rapid growth of new family formations in their market area had
expanded demand and had also created a growth market for
Wahoo’s products. At the same time, remodeling of older garages
—particularly in the enlarging to accommodate bigger and longer
autos—provided a sizable market for Wahoo. The company had
six major sales channels:
1. Wholesale lumber and hardware dealers who sold to con
tractors. These dealers represent the largest segment of Wahoo’s
market.
2. Tract building contractors who contracted for work in single
and multiple dwelling construction.
3. Tract builders of housing developments who purchased
directly from a garage door manufacturer.
4. Garage distributors who sold a “package” garage to a builder.
5. Small local contractors who repaired, replaced, or built
garages.
6. The home owners, sold primarily through local newspaper
advertising on a do-it-yourself basis. Installation assistance was
offered, but held to be unnecessary in the advertising. Very few
direct sales were made to this market.
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The issue o f sales policy
T he competition in the garage door industry was relatively
fierce despite a steady and growing demand.
Product design had proved to be one important feature in meet
ing competition. Design had to appeal to both a contractor and
the ultimate user from both a functional and appearance viewpoint.
Price, however, had become the most predominant feature of
the highly competitive industry. To compete in the market, Wahoo
carried three basic models (budget, de luxe and custom), as did
most of their competitors. The higher priced models, in less
demand, were relatively stable in price. The budget model was
more vulnerable to price cutting throughout the industry—largely
as a result of severe price pressure from tract builders of develop
ment houses. Almost all buyers of garage doors were initially
drawn to the lowest priced model. They quite often purchased
the higher priced doors, however, after a quality comparison.
Wahoo sold a well designed product and backed up their quality
product with a guarantee. The company pushed the budget model
saleswise, as it was the simplest to sell and understandably would
always be accountable for the largest volume of sales.
Pricing attitudes of Wahoo’s competitors varied. Most of them
were also small businesses, presumably in business to make a profit;
but they tried to accomplish this end in various ways. One, who
obviously believed in high prices on lower volume, apparently
did quite well. A few relied heavily upon engineering talent and
patent protection and sold only luxury priced doors. The majority
believed, as Wahoo did, in high volume at lower prices and accord
ingly made every effort to meet the lowest competitive price.
Several smaller companies in the industry had gone out of business
during the last few years.
Wahoo had a simple salesman’s incentive plan wherein com
missions were based solely on sales volume. The company, at one
time, had experimented with commissions based on “territorial
profit,” which was sales, less certain direct sales expenses. However,
this became too cumbersome, and did not tie in with the incentive
system for the owners which had always been based solely on sales
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volume. The owners had agreed that this was the best way to
reward themselves, over base salaries, for their respective efforts.

Use o f available cost data
in profit p la nning and pricing
T he owners had worked their ‘profit planning” on an “average”
month budget of expenses. Based on an average percentage of
gross margin earned, they believed that all sales over a pre
computed break-even volume should produce profits. They had
paid little attention to price-cost relationships in their sales prac
tices. This had often been criticized by the factory manager. By
using production cost reports, prepared only at the insistence of
the factory manager, the price-cost relationship of the various
garage door models had been informally reviewed, but had not
seemed to prove very much. The cost reports included direct labor,
material cost and standard factory overhead—presently 160 per
cent of direct labor. This information was prepared from payroll
time records and material requisitions, but was not tied in with
the general accounting records. On certain large orders or bids, this
information had occasionally been reviewed. The offering price
per unit under consideration, less the “total” manufacturing costs,
and an allowance for “other overhead,” was inspected, and the
effect of volume on the resultant “mathematical loss” would be
considered. This, according to management, never appeared to
prove anything because of the effect of the increased sales on the
“over-all profit planning under their budget system.”

H ow the CPA sold the need fo r
price and cost study
I t took only one more loss, in April 1959, to point up the fact
that there were basic deficiencies in the Wahoo operation. The
investor, with little opposition from an equally concerned manage
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ment, arranged for a meeting of the owners, the CPA and himself
to explore the situation.
The CPA was gratified to find that the owners welcomed outside
“interference.” There was no doubt in their minds that they were
making mistakes. While attempting to probe further into price-cost
relationships in the conference, the CPA sensed that each of the
owners felt the other partners were the ones making the mistakes.
Each of them seemed to feel that selling policies in other regions
could be improved; but each was equally convinced that the policy
in his own region was correct and necessary in view of the par
ticular competitive forces.
The CPA was asked how the entire problem could best be re
viewed. He suggested that if a simple pricing study were made,
through some basic sales analysis, and if adequate cost data were
obtained and analyzed using the “direct costing” concept, he
believed that a wealth of knowledge would become available to
aid in evaluating the company’s price and sales policies. He briefly
explained the direct costing concept, pointing out that the record
keeping practices of the past would create several analysis prob
lems; but he indicated that enough information was present for
study. Changes in the accounting system could be introduced to
improve the use of this technique in the future, if it were later
deemed desirable.
It made sense to everyone present that if costs could be allocated
to individual operations and products, and then compared to sales
prices of the same products, it would be quite simple to locate the
trouble areas in prices or costs. The CPA made it quite clear that
the necessary analyses could not be done overnight. However, he
felt that if a man from his staff were assigned to spearhead the
analysis work and if the accounting staff of Wahoo could make
some time available, the work could be completed in about eight
weeks. The estimate of what the total fee might run did not raise
a single eyebrow. The apprehensive investor insisted on a formal
report from the CPA which would contain all of his independent
findings and recommendations. It had been an easy sale for the
CPA on a job he was confident he could perform well in view of
two past experiences in studies of this nature.
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The CPA

program and p la n

T he CPA started the engagement within a week. The first analy
sis was to be made of sales in order to determine in what regions
and on what models prices had softened from “basic” price lists.
From this analysis he also expected to be able to report on sales
trend, and perhaps highlight deficiencies or recommend changes
in sales policy. Next, the cost analysis work would be done. He
would then develop the product cost-price relationships and report
on them. The analysis efforts were to be directed primarily to sales
and costs of the garage door line.
The work required to analyze sales was relatively simple. It
involved, for the most part, the preparation and coding of sales
invoices which would be turned over to an independent agency
for tabulation. Some additional information, primarily on freight
and cash discounts allowed, would have to be obtained from the
records. Assistants, in close co-operation with the tabulating service
agency, could handle this part of the job. The cost information
would be somewhat more difficult to obtain, and allocation of costs
to products could prove tricky. He would handle this himself.

The results o f the CPA’s sales analysis
T he basic price schedule for the three models of doors, F.O.B.
plant, had been developed by the owners from two viewpoints.
First, they wanted to price the doors competitively; second, they
wanted to provide what they felt was the best sales leverage to
effectively interchange models in selling to either volume or small
unit buyers. The basic price schedule follows:
Units

l - 10 ..................
1 0 - 5 0 ..................
Over 5 0 ..................

Budget

$65.00
$55.00
$45.00

D e Luxe

Custom

$85.00
$72.50
$65.00

$100.00
$ 95.00
$ 85.00

Within a few weeks, the CPA was able to prepare the following
schedules of net sales prices, derived from the sales analysis.
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Average Selling Prices—Per Unit
Budget Model
All
Local

March 1958 ................ $49.30
April 1958 ..................
48.70
May 1958 ....................
49.45
Total units for 3 months
49.10
%Below average “basic
price” ......................
12.4%
January 1959 .............. $47.30
February 1959 ............
48.85
March 1959 ................
47.60
April 1959 ..................
46.95
May 1959 ....................
47.10
Total units for 5 months
47.30
%Below average "basic
price” ......................
15.1%
$ Decrease in average
unit price .............. $ 1.80

Central

W estern

$50.90
51.20
51.10
51.05

$47.35
47.30
44.75
46.30

10.1%
$51.05
51.15
50.00
49.20
50.25
50.10

14.6%
$46.25
47.65
46.85
47.25
46.90
47.80

11.7%

11.7%

14.7%

13.8%

.10

$1.25

$

.95

$

Territories

Before presenting the sales price information on the other mod
els, a brief explanation of the approach the CPA took in arriving
at average selling prices must be given.
The sales data had not only been analyzed as to billed sales prices,
but had been classified by quantity ordered and freight charged.
By combining these data with additional information as to freight
allowances and cash discounts allowed after due dates, the CPA
was able to arrive at the average net selling price. It was his fear
that freight allowances and cash discounts were being used as
sales tools; which, of course, would contribute to the softening
of prices. He was careful to retain analyses of the freight and
discount allowances, made during both periods, as well as data
relative to shipments on which freight had not been charged in
the first place. His primary concern was in arriving at a compara
tive "per cent below average basic price” during each of the
periods. To accomplish this, the sales analysis information as to
order quantity had permitted computation of what the over-all
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weighted basic price should have been, for each region, compared
to what it actually had been.
Although the CPA did not formally schedule the information,
it was also simple to analyze how each quantity group had fared
pricewise in the respective periods. He would like to have obtained
more than the basic necessary information on sales by type of
customer, but he felt that the information on the number of orders
in each region from the various trade classes could adequately
supplement his presentation and assist in evaluating the conten
tions of any of the regional managers that the nature of his sales
territory was “different.”
The average selling prices of the other models are presented in
the following schedules.
Average Selling Prices—Per Unit
De Luxe Model
March 1958 ................
April 1958 ..................
May 1958 ....................
Total units for 3 months
%Below average “basic
price” ......................
January 1959 ..............
February 1959 ............
March 1959 ................
April 1959 ..................
May 1959 ....................
Total units for 5 months
%Below average “basic
price” ......................
$ Decrease in average
unit price ..............

All
Territories

Local

Central

W estern

$71.85
72.25
70.90
71.40

$70.95
70.50
72.05
71.10

$71.35
69.20
69.85
70.15

7.3%
$68.20
66.80
66.90
63.45
64.75
65.30

7.2%
$66.45
67.00
68.20
66.95
65.35
66.80

7.9%
$68.85
68.25
67.90
67.50
68.10
68.05

7.5%

14.1%

12.3%

10.2%

12.4%

$ 6.10

$ 4.30

$ 2.10

$4.30

While the CPA readily admits that the sales and price analysis
did not contain all of the detailed information that could have
been extracted by the tabulating equipment, it was adequate to
44

uncover a wealth of information. The data would not only be useful
in further price-cost analysis; it provided the basis for an interim
report on sales and pricing practices that the CPA felt required
immediate attention.
Average Selling Prices—Per Unit
Custom Model

March 1958 ................
April 1958 ..................
May 1958 ....................
Total units for 3 months
%Below average “basic
price” ......................
January 1959 ..............
February 1959 ............
March 1959 ................
April 1959 ..................
May 1959 ....................
Total units for 5 months
%Below average “basic
price” ......................
$ Decrease in average
unit price ..............

All
Territories

Local

Central

W estern

$94.50
93.80
94.20
94.10

$95.05
95.20
94.85
94.95

$95.50
96.05
95.95
95.70

3.0%
$93.60
93.65
93.70
92.90
92.95
93.20

2.2%
$93.95
94.10
94.55
93.95
93.45
94.00

2.1%
$95.20
95.20
95.10
95.15
95.75
95.25

2.6%

4.1%

3.0%

2.2%

3.4%

.95

$ .45

$ .75

$

.90

$

SECTION II
THE REPORT ON SALES AND
PRICING PRACTICES
T he CPA’s report on sales and pricing practices ran to eighteen
pages. He could have reduced its length, but he felt that the extra
words had helped to make the report more comprehensible and
meaningful to the sales-oriented owners. It is impractical to repro
duce his eighteen-page report; but it is interesting to observe that
the CPA’s conclusions and recommendations are based on his own
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training and experience in marketing to the facts disclosed by his
analysis of sales. For that reason, the more significant comments
of his report have been condensed and are presented here.

A SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

Analysis o f price softening o f products
His first stress was in reporting that prices had softened con
siderably in a period of one year, on all models and in all terri
tories. Based on the small losses incurred during the first five
months of 1959, he informed management that a continuing soften
ing of prices (which was undoubtedly the trend) would result
in larger losses and, inevitably, in the company’s failure.
He disclosed that the budget model—the model subject to the
fiercest competition—was not the only trouble area. The mild
softening of the custom model had been primarily due to non
enforcement of the freight and cash discount policies and for the
most part the realized basic sales prices between years had not
varied at all. The CPA called particular attention to the softening
of price on the de luxe model. While the percentage decrease from
basic price had dropped to 12.4 per cent from 7.5 per cent a year
earlier, this was an over-all percentage decrease of 4.9 per cent
whereas the average selling prices per unit on the budget model
had softened only 2.1 per cent on an over-all basis during the same
year. He contended that the softening on this model might well
be due to the attempt to sell the de luxe models at substantially
lower than list prices, in order to combat the competition on the
budget model. In other words, he asked management to question
their sales practices to determine if it had not become a sales tool
to offer the higher quality product at a “bargain” price in order to
effect a more profitable sale than could be obtained by underselling
competition on the budget model. Through a short supplementary
presentation of quantities sold by models, he was able to substan
tiate his viewpoint. There had been a steady upward increase in
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unit sales of the de luxe model and a slight b ut steady decreasing
volume on unit sales of the budget model. He also pointed out
that management should be particularly concerned about the
softening on the de luxe model in that the dollar reduction in unit
contributions to sales was $4.30 below that of the preceding year.
In contrast, a softening on the budget model had amounted to a
dollar reduction of only $1.25 per unit—and a portion of this had
been due to relaxed freight and cash discount policies.

Analysis o f price softening by sales regions
T he CPA pointed out that it must be kept in mind that the freight
problem was most significant as it affected the western region;
secondarily as it affected the central region; and of lesser signifi
cance in the local region. In other words, there appeared to be
more opportunity for price softening through freight allowance
in those areas that would ordinarily result in more freight charges.
In spite of this, the price softening was the most dangerous in
the local area. On all three models, the local area had experienced
the worst percentage of price decline. The central region was not
too far behind, but, in terms of percentages, had experienced con
siderable price softening only in the de luxe model. In the western
region where the effect of freight allowances would seemingly con
tribute significantly to price softening, experience over the year
had been considerably better on all models. The 1959 prices for
the budget and custom models were only one-tenth of 1 per cent
below average prices of the 1958 period. While the de luxe model
price had distinctly softened, it had dropped only 2.3 per cent.
The CPA scheduled more information relative to the dollar
amounts by which the unearned cash discounts and freight
allowances had contributed to the price softening by regions.
In order to implement management evaluation, he also provided
certain unit sales information by territory. An increase in total unit
sales was evident in the local region. At least, the CPA concluded,
the softening of prices in this area had contributed to additional
sales. It was expected that the central region would have accounted
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for the second largest percentage increase in unit sales but actu
ally this had not been true. The western region had made more
progress in this regard. He believed management would logically
conclude that the western regional sales group had done the best
job during the past year. The analysis had proved that sales by
lines of distribution (type of customer) were relatively similar for
all of the regions, and the CPA was therefore unable to point to
any market characteristics in the western region that, at least on
the surface, would have made their job simpler than in either of
the other two territories.

Recommendations fo r strengthening prices
T he second part of the CPA’s report was devoted to his recom
mendations for strengthening the price policy.
In leading off this section of his report, he suggested that the
“strengthening of prices” must be defined as asking as much as
can be asked in the face of all the pressures for price reduction
which affect the sale of garage doors. He also made clear that his
recommendations were made in light of the fact that the price-set
ting policies of Wahoo would always be a delicate process requiring
a feel for many intangibles in a dynamic market. He pointed out
that no formula could be provided to measure precisely all of the
influence which would affect the willingness of a customer to
accept a certain price at a certain time. Essentially, Wahoo would
have to meet competition.
The CPA recommended that the primary objective of the
Wahoo management should be to develop a revised sales policy
which would correct deficiencies disclosed from his sales analysis,
in an administrative framework that would preserve control over
the sales effort without injecting an undue amount of rigidity into
the organization. On the other hand, there was an equally clear
need for limiting the decisions to be made on the salesman’s level.
W ith these practical considerations in mind, the CPA advanced
eleven recommendations that he felt would contribute to the
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strengthening of prices. These have been extracted, in part, from
the report and follow:
1. Freight terms. In spite of the fact that several competitors
are absorbing freight costs, freight terms should continue to be
F.O.B. plant. The analysis work has disclosed that the terms are
admittedly price-bargaining tools, but if these terms are changed
to the terms of the competitors, further revenue loss will result.
Strong attempts to collect freight on larger orders should be insti
tuted by the sales force, and small orders should only be accepted
with the previous understanding that the customer will pay the
transportation cost. The cost per unit of delivering the garage
doors into the western region can amount to as much as 9 per cent
of the basic selling price. Forgiveness of freight, therefore, is a
serious matter. In the development of new accounts or reactivation
of old accounts, freight terms should be negotiated in Wahoo’s
favor. If a consistent effort is made with all accounts, freight recov
ery will undoubtedly increase.
2. Cash discounts. The use of cash discounts as pricing aids has
further contributed to the deterioration of price policy. Moreover,
the accounting staff is wasting valuable time when it is unable to
determine which customers have been granted “special” discount
terms beyond the normal payment period. Perhaps a more serious
consideration to Wahoo in the present use of cash discounts as
price reducers is that analysis proves distinctly that cash flow is
being significantly affected. This is particularly significant in view
of the heavy obligations assumed under the bankruptcy settlement
of Wahoo during the next two years—and the fact that delayed
payment results in larger interest cost on receivables being
financed. In other words, the “special” cash discount arrangements
have negatively affected not only price softening but the critical
financing problems of the company. Experience dictates that a
customer who has been granted special cash discounts will con
tinue to expect them, and the sales force should immediately
discard the practice of using cash discounts as a factor in price
setting and embark on a period of customer re-education.
3. Quantity prices. The sales analysis has disclosed that quantity
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prices are not being maintained even near those listed in the price
schedule. The sales department must attempt to overcome buyer
resistance by pointing out that the jobbers themselves only use
quantity discounts after scheduled volume levels have been
reached. Another sales argument in this regard is to emphasize
continually the fact that the handling of small orders is more
expensive.
4. Use of published price lists. Wahoo does not, as a matter of
industry custom, issue formal price lists or schedules to its custom
ers. Published price sheets will generally add a degree of stability
to price structure by establishing an upper level for prices. They
will contribute, at least, to what might be called price respectability
and will help to establish in the mind of a customer how much of a
discount he is actually requesting. The published price lists should,
of course, emphasize the freight, and cash discount terms of Wahoo.
5. Price changes. The sales analysis, plus subsequent discussion
with the sales manager and salesmen in the local territory, leads to
the following recommendation:
Although it is not nearly the largest company serving the local
market, Wahoo is attempting to initiate basic price changes. An
organization the size of Wahoo should not attempt to set the price
pattern for the industry. While this has undoubtedly contributed to
a higher sales volume in the local region, sales personnel have con
firmed that it has produced the following unhappy results:
(a ) The price cuts have been difficult to reverse. Wahoo—and
its competitors who have met the lowered prices—may now have
to wait until a marked cost or demand cycle offers an excuse to
return to previous price levels.
(b ) The advantages of such price cuts have generally been
short-lived. The sales benefit has been quickly lost because com
petitors have cut their prices either directly or indirectly to meet
those of Wahoo.
(c) The over-all market demand for garage doors has appar
ently not been affected by price cuts, either those instituted by
Wahoo or by any of its competitors. In other words, the demand
for garage doors has proved to be relatively inelastic in any given
set of general market conditions. The price reductions, in view
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of the fact that competitors will meet them, do not appear to
stimulate an increased volume over a sustained period. Nor is
it likely that the price reductions have contributed to an over-all
industry demand for this product.
(d ) The constantly changing prices negate the value of pub
lished price lists which, as mentioned earlier, should be published
in an attempt to strengthen prices.
Thus, while an aggressive sales policy is undoubtedly an attri
bute of any management, it is recommended that Wahoo follow
rather than attempt to lead in the setting of prices. This policy
should be pursued not only in respect to price reduction but also,
of course, in respect to the general raising of prices.
6. Lines of distribution and customer concentration. The man
agement of Wahoo should give consideration to the present con
centration of sales effort. There is evidence in the sales analysis
that prices quoted to tract builders, even on small orders, must of
necessity be considerably lower than those to the other lines of
distribution. It appears that additional effort might better be
directed to wholesale lumber and hardware dealers, garage dis
tributors and service agents. Because there is less appearance of
price softening on these sales, they would seem to be a logical area
of concentration.
Individual door sales to home owners is one area where price
softening has not occurred, either through straight discount or
allowance of freight or cash discount. This market has not been
actively sought by the management of Wahoo; yet there appears
to be some justification for suggesting that this market should
bear a heavier degree of concentration in the future. While there
is an obvious problem in actively competing with its own cus
tomers, certain methods could be explored by which Wahoo might
effectively increase direct sales without significantly affecting the
sales or arousing the resentment of hardware or lumber dealers
and service agents.
7. Sales promotion and advertising. A primary purpose of these
functions should be to contribute to the strengthening of prices.
The policies of Wahoo do not appear to accomplish or even attempt
to accomplish this end. Sales promotion, which generally takes the
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form of co-operative advertising with customers, has been used
often as a price kick-back rather than as a bona fide attempt to
place the name of Wahoo in front of the public. This, of course,
also contributes to price softening. This factor has not been con
sidered in the analysis of average selling prices because it is
frankly impossible to determine from the records if advertising
benefits were obtained from the allowances or not. This has, in
turn, contributed to confusion in the accounting department as to
reimbursement for "co-operative advertising” when bills have been
submitted without adequate proof. The following comments on
the advertising policy of Wahoo are in no way the result of sales
analysis but are independently offered as they appear somewhat
related.
(a) Most of the advertising has been addressed to home
owners. This appears to be contradictory to the fact that direct
selling to this market has not been done.
(b ) Local advertising to the home owner encourages selfinstallation. Sales managers and salesmen have indicated that
there has never been a problem in obtaining what are considered
adequate service charges for installation. Management ought to
consider whether this form of advertising may contribute to a
loss of sales that could otherwise produce profits if service were
offered.
Advertising and sales promotion policies do not come under the
jurisdiction of one individual, nor are they budgeted closely. It is
suggested that if the function were delegated to one responsible
person, co-ordination of the over-all program and increased bene
fits might result.
8. Price-range policies—and the interchangeability of models.
The offering of three basic models in various price ranges is pre
sumably designed to accomplish two basic purposes: (1) to enable
sale to all sections of the market, and (2) to afford a certain prestige
to the lower-priced models through sale of the high-priced custom
model.
Model interchangeability should be used by Wahoo as a "price
strengthener.” The sales analysis has indicated that the inter
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changeability of models, in fact, is contributing to price softening
rather than strengthening.
Analysis of average selling prices indicates that dollarwise the
most significant softening during the last year has occurred on the
de luxe model, particularly in the local and central territories.
Customers are being induced to “trade-up” to the de luxe model
from the budget model at a price dangerously close to that of
the budget model. This seemingly has occurred as a result of the
strong competition in the sale of cheaper models throughout the
industry which has led salesmen to try to convince customers to
trade-up to the de luxe model at a dangerously low price differ
ential. If the marketing advantages of carrying three models are
to be recognized, Wahoo’s sales policy must somehow revert to
a position where model interchangeability contributes to a price
strengthening of lower-priced models rather than to price erosion
of the higher-priced models.
9. Sales forecasting. While each sales manager is informally
establishing dollar sales quotas for his territory, there is no formal
company-wide procedure that accurately forecasts over-all sales
volume. The constantly fluctuating market conditions underscore
the need for a formal sales forecast. If properly prepared in terms
of both units and dollars, it would enable the management to
develop the sales and areas of sales concentration, and it would
implement decisions with respect to engineering, finance, produc
tion, research and development. It would also serve as a forerunner
to an over-all company budget system which ought to be devel
oped as soon as possible. The recommended procedures for instal
lation of sales forecasting and over-all budgeting are, of course,
beyond the scope of this report.
10. Sales commission policy. The incentive plan presently in
effect for salesmen and regional managers does not contribute to
price strengthening. On the contrary, it contributes to the destruc
tion of a firm price structure.
It is recommended that the “straight sales over-ride” commis
sion policy be abandoned and that a substitute plan be conceived
which will contribute to profit objectives rather than to sales
volume alone. Any revised sales incentive plan should be pat53

tem ed so that sales commissions will not be paid to salesmen or
regional managers until such time as the company’s profit objec
tives are obtained. Alternative plans are beyond the scope of this
report; but assistance in their formation would be gladly furnished,
if and when it is decided to revise the present program.
The present form of “over-ride” commissions for regional man
agers is also contributing to the eroding of price structure. In addi
tion, it can be challenged on the ground that it is incompatible
with sound sales administration practices when the compensation
of a regional manager is dependent only on his own direct sales
effort and results. In other words, it might logically be expected
that the administrative responsibilities of both sales and other
company policies are unconsciously subordinated by the ownerregional managers in favor of the motivation provided them —
dollar commissions on dollar sales.
II . Establishment of price floors. It is imperative that the man
agement of Wahoo take immediate steps to set tentative price floors
for each of the models. As indicated in the analysis of “average
selling prices,” the trend toward further price erosion must be
halted at once. While price-cost relationships must be analyzed
before the establishment of permanent price floors, it is recom
mended that tentative floors be established. The following schedule
would apply to hardware and lumber distributors. Floors should
be established for all other lines of distribution.
Local Region
Budget

D e Luxe

Custom

M a n a g e r.......... .................................. $48.50
49.50
Salesm en.......... ..................................
Central Region
M a n a g e r.......... .................................. $51.00
Salesm en.......... ..................................
52.00
Western Region
M a n a g e r.......... .................................. $48.50
49.50
Salesm en.......... ..................................
All prices are exclusive of freight charges.

$66.50
67.50

$93.50
94.50

$68.50
69.00

$93.50
94.50

$69.00
69.50

$96.00
96.50

These tentative price floors should be reviewed immediately
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when cost analysis has been completed. The purpose of the floors
for the moment should merely be to halt the continual trend to
lower prices.
A word of caution is in order. All sales personnel must recognize
that the floor prices are not prices that are now charged. It must be
impressed on all sales personnel that these prices must be exceeded
where possible, and that they must be plus freight and plus cash
discount.
The regional managers will have to take a firm stand with respect
to both pricing practices of salesmen and requests to authorize
prices lower than salesmen themselves can offer. Management’s
ultimate goal in this regard should be to establish prices and allow
salesmen no discretion whatsoever in the setting of prices.

Summary
T he CPA emphasized that this report was of an interim nature
and that no action could be taken on some of his recommendations
until the analysis of price-cost relationships and product profit
ability became available.
He recommended further that the members of management of
Wahoo meet and collectively analyze his report.
It was well received. As the CPA had anticipated, each of the
owners had attempted to justify his results with claims that his
territories were "different.” However, with the investor serving as
moderator and the CPA offering additional facts and interpreta
tions of the analyzed data, the meeting was extremely constructive.
The manager of the local region expressed the opinion that the
CPA’s report had really opened his eyes to the many factors within
the sales policy that were distinctly in need of attention. He chided
his partners and, in doing so, chided himself on the inability of a
sales-oriented management to see the deficiencies an accountant
had pointed out. They had disagreed with the CPA ( and among
themselves) with respect to some of his recommendations; but
the quarrels involved "methods of correction” rather than prin
ciples. They all agreed that his report disclosed marketing defects
which urgently required their attention.
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The conversation ultimately turned to the CPA’s next step. The
danger areas within the pricing policy were now apparent. The
owner-managers were now anxious to apply costs against selling
prices in order, as one of them put it, “to see which product we
should push.” Apparently, thought the CPA, a salesman never
changes.

SECTION III
The CPA’s Report on His Direct Costing Analysis
of Product Profitability and the Application
of the Contribution Accounting
Technique to Wahoo’s Operations

A SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

Scope o f study and methods used in analysis
T he CPA explained that his cost analysis and allocations would
be made from the accounting records for the five-month period
ending May 31, 1959. He also made it clear in the report that the
basic accounting records had not been maintained in a fashion
that would guarantee absolute accuracy and that in the area of
cost and expense allocation, particularly, he had required the
factory manager and the owners to make a good many estimates
of expenses allocable to certain products, which the records did
not disclose.
The CPA, incidentally, admits that he made a few false starts
in his cost and expense allocation. He had, for example, taken a
“production area cost center” viewpoint to start but determined
finally that the approach should be along the lines of allocating
costs directly to the product lines themselves.
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He had found that the prime costs—the raw material and direct
labor—were reasonably simple to segregate by product and that
the heart of his problem had been in the segregation of variable
costs and fixed costs and the assignment of the variable costs to
products. Attempts at segregation created a number of questions.
The CPA ultimately resolved all of them through discussions with
the factory manager or other personnel, and was able to place each
cost and expense into one of the following categories: primarily
variable, primarily fixed, or both variable and fixed. He had been
forced to assume that the costs placed in either of the first two
categories were either all variable or all fixed, and he then pro
ceeded to segregate each of the costs and expenses in the last
category into its fixed and variable portions.
In addition to estimating the amount of each expense that was
allocable to each product line, a good deal of estimating also had
to be done by the CPA and the factory manager in determining
the extent to which hardware and accessories pertained to each of
the products. In other words, while much of the hardware and
accessory equipment was wholly interchangeable on the various
models of garage doors, there were many exceptions. The company
accounting system did not permit the segregation of sound cost
data on hardware and accessories, but reliable estimates appeared
adequate for present purposes.
Although the primary objective of the cost and expense alloca
tion was in connection with garage door sales, the CPA allocated
all expenses to all products and services of Wahoo, in order to
account for the distribution of all variable costs and expenses. The
variable items were allocated into five “product” categories: the
budget, de luxe and custom garage doors, and two further cate
gories, (1) door accessories and miscellaneous products and (2)
installation and service.
After the determination of the variable manufacturing, selling,
and general and administrative expenses, the CPA enlisted the
aid of management and operating people in carefully evaluating
how these expenses fluctuated with changes in sales and produc
tion. It had been agreed that both the variable selling and general
and administrative expenses showed a distinct and consistent
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pattern which would enable them to be measured in direct relation
to sales volume. The variable manufacturing expenses, the factory
manager was convinced, would vary in reasonably close proportion
to direct labor cost

Results o f cost study
The CPA's report included a simple statement for the fivemonth period which was intended primarily to show the contribu
tion (net sales minus total variable costs) that was made to cover
fixed expenses.
This statement was placed first in his report as the basis for a
brief explanation of the contribution accounting concept and of
his handling of fixed expenses. The CPA had noted some lack of
comprehension on the part of the management when he had briefly
explained the relationship of variable and fixed expenses under the
contribution concept. He knew that management must have a
clear understanding of what the report called fixed expenses. The
term was defined in his report as the cost of “staying in business”
which would continue unless plant activity, sales, and other opera
tions were completely discontinued. The report also explained
why any attempt to allocate fixed expenses to products would have
to be completely arbitrary. It had appeared to the CPA that the
fixed expenses were somewhat out of line, particularly in the manu
facturing area. His report attempted to drive home the point that
any reduction in fixed expenses would result in a 100 per cent profit
before taxes, for every dollar of reduction. The first statement he
prepared is shown opposite.
This statement showed the effect on profitability for the total
sales mix. The next statement broke down the sales by product
groups. The purpose of this statement was to show the cost-price
relationship of each of the products and the contribution each had
made to the “staying in business” expenses.
The statement objectively disclosed two basic facts:
1. Sale of accessories and miscellaneous items, and installation
and service revenue, were contributing to fixed expense, percent
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agewise, at far higher rates than the sales of the principal line. It
was fortunate that these occasional sales and services had occurred.
If they had not done so, the staying-in-business costs, which would
not have changed, would have exceeded the dollar contribution
from garage doors alone by almost $78,000.
Statement of Contribution to Fixed Expenses
and Resulting Net Loss—All Products
For Five-Month Period Ended May 3 1 , 1959
Net sales.......................................................... $847,554 100.00%
Less variable c o s ts ........................................
595,033
70.21
29.79%
Contribution to fixed expense . . . . .............. $252,521
Less fixed expenses:
6.13%
General and adm inistrative.. $51,963
5.06
A dvertising............................
42,823
11.69
99,112
Manufacturing—Note A . . . .
8.61
S ellin g ....................................
73,003
31.49%
T o ta l........................ .............. $266,901
Net operating lo s s .......................... .............. $(14,380) (1.70)%
Note A—Includes engineering and designing.

Statement of Contribution to Fixed Expenses
of Individual Product Groups
For Five-Month Period Ended May 3 1 , 1959

Net sales.............
Less variable
c o s ts ............
Contribution to
fixed expense .
%of net sales
contributed .

Garage Doors

Accessories
and Misc.

Installation
and Service

Total

$710,141

$82,695

$54,718

$847,554

521,029

49,017

24,987

595,033

$189,112

$33,678

$29,731

$252,521

26.63%

40.73%

54.33%

29.79%
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2. The policy of discouraging installation and service, which the
CPA had questioned from a sales viewpoint, now appeared to make
even less sense. It was an extremely profitable operation, contrary
to the owners’ views.
The CPA’s next statement was intended to show a price-cost
relationship on the individual garage doors. From sales analysis,
he already had the sales dollars by product. By reassigning the
variable costs attaching to production and sale of garage doors
only, to the three types of doors carried, he was able to prepare
the following statement.
Statement of Contribution to Fixed Expense
of Garage Doors
For Five-Month Period Ended May 3 1 , 1959

Net sales....................
Less variable costs ..
Contribution to fixed
expense ................
%of net sales
c o n trib u te d ..........

Budget
Model

D e Luxe
Model

Custom
Model

Total

$371,996
263,363

$225,708
186,848

$112,437
70,818

$710,041
521,029

$108,633

$ 38,860

$ 41,619 $189,112

29.20%

17.22%

37.02%

26.63%

Recognizing a similarity in the production and sale of the three
models, the CPA felt that by one further step it could be deter
mined whether cost or selling price was the factor primarily respon
sible for the high percentage of contribution of the custom model
and the low contribution afforded by the de luxe model. This
information he added as a footnote to the statement.

%of sales to total sales . . . .
%of variable costs to
total c o sts........................
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Budget
Model

D e Luxe
Model

Custom
Model

Total

52.4%

31.8%

15.8%

100.0%

50.5%

35.9%

13.6%

100.0%

In his comments, he reasoned that the significant price softening
and low selling prices of the de luxe model, rather than a higher
proportionate variable cost, was the reason for its poor contribution.
He later questioned the logic of his position—and had some dif
ficulty explaining it during a later conference. However, regardless
of the validity of his assumptions, he had undoubtedly located a
serious trouble spot in the price-cost relationship of the de luxe
model.
It would have been reasonable to assume from the sales analysis
data alone that a pattern of contribution on the different models
would emerge, as it actually did. He recommended in his report
that any tentative decisions reached on the basis of his report on
sales and pricing practices relative to either lines of customer con
centration, the interchangeability of models or the establishment
of price floors should now be re-examined in the light of these
supplemental cost data.

Use o f the break-even point
as a p ro fit p la n n in g tool
T he CPA had been exposed thoroughly during the course of his
study to the management’s method of attempting to predetermine
profitability through the use of the “average month budget.”
This was, in reality, nothing more than the total of an “average
month’s expenses” divided by an “average mark-up.” In principle,
it resulted in a break-even sales volume required to cover all costs
and expense. The required sales volume had been reached in each
of the last five months, and the management had a difficult time
reconciling their break-even computations to the losses Wahoo
had continued to show.
In view of their interest in examining their operation from a
break-even point of view, the CPA felt this was one area where he
could assist the owner-managers in acquiring an understanding of
the proper over-all concept of break-even. If they could substitute
proper variable and fixed costs in their computations in place of
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the lumped “averages” they had been using, he was sure the salesminded management could use this as a simple but effective profit
planning and control technique.
He prefaced this section of his report with a colorful chart re
produced on page 63. The loss area was red, the profit area black.
It was professionally drawn and an attention-getter.
The CPA’s commentary on the use of the break-even concept
as a management guide was as follows:
The management of Wahoo in their application of the break
even concept to Wahoo’s operations is assuming that the break
even point remains constant. The break-even point is being
computed by dividing the total of all expenses, both fixed and
variable, by an “average” gross profit percentage. Actually, the
break-even point is constantly changing. If this concept is to be
used as an operational guide, the following must be kept in mind:
Break-even is the point at which any given sales volume equals
the variable costs directly related to this volume of sales—plus the
fixed expenses which remain constant at all sales volumes. Review
ing the operations of Wahoo for the five months ended May 31,
1959 as shown in the foregoing schedules, it has been determined
that fixed expenses were $266,901 and that the percentage of con
tribution, for the entire sales mix, was 29.79 per cent. By dividing
the fixed expenses by the percentage of contribution, a break-even
sales volume of $895,900 is computed. The following is proof of
this calculation:
Break-even sales com puted..................
Variable expenses @ 70.21% of sales. . .
Contribution to fixed expenses............
Fixed expenses......................................
P ro fit......................................................

$895,9
629,0
$266,9
266,9
—0—

Actually, Wahoo sustained a sales volume which was lower than
the break-even point by 5.39 per cent. In a profitable operation,
this difference between actual sales and break-even sales is called
the margin of safety. In the Wahoo operation it represents the
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W AHOO

BUILDING SUPPLY C O M P A N Y
BREAKEVEN CHART

WITH OPERATING RESULTS INDICATED FOR
COSTS
AN D
EXPENSES

FIVE MONTHS ENDED MAY 31, 1959

( IN THOUSANDS
OF DOLLARS)

SALES ( IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

*
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE___ $52.0
ADVERTISING ........................................ 42.8
MANUFACTURING AND
E N G IN EE R IN G .................................... 99.1
S E L LIN G ................................................... 73.0
$266.9

t
VARIABLE COSTS AND EXPENSES. . 70.21%
CONTRIBUTION TO
FIXED EXPENSE............................... 29.79%
MARGIN OF SAFETY (LOSS)...........

5.39%
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margin of loss. The margin of loss has been computed as follows:
895.9 - 847.6 (actual sales) = 48.3 ÷ 895.9 = 5.39%
To relate the contribution concept to the loss Wahoo incurred,
the margin of loss in net sales, less proportionate variable costs,
equals the net loss for the period. Stated in figures:
$48.3 - 33.9 (48.3 X 70.21%) = $14.4 net loss
In other words, an additional sales volume of $48,000 during
the period would have resulted in a break-even. This does not
mean unit sales are necessarily inadequate. If “average sales prices”
had yielded 6 per cent more, Wahoo would have shown a profit.
The sales analysis indicated that prices on the budget, de luxe and
custom models have softened by 2.1 per cent, 4.9 per cent and .8
per cent, respectively, in the last year. It is evident, therefore, that
if cost reductions cannot be effected or if sales volume cannot be
increased by 6 per cent at present prices, then Wahoo must realize
average selling prices even higher than those of a year ago to assure
profits. While cost and price data should be studied regularly,
management may reasonably forecast break-even points in the
immediate future on the basis of fixed and variable costs disclosed
by the cost analysis for the five-month period under review.

Use o f the contribution concept
in pricing decisions
T he CPA’s report also explained further how the contribution
concept could be used to assist management decision when pricing
changes were being considered, or when changes in the sales mix
occurred. He also indicated that not only could each of the various
products in the line be regularly tested to determine how much
each was contributing to the over-all results, but that sales terri
tories could also be evaluated similarly. He also stressed the effect
on profits that decisions to add to or reduce fixed expenses would
have. The results could be evaluated well in advance by keeping
the contribution theory in mind. Finally, he emphasized that the
concept could be effectively utilized to assist in the formulation of
formal operating and cash budgets.
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It has not been considered worthwhile to cover these points in
detail.
The report covered at some length how the contribution method
could be used to assist in determining price proposals on large bids,
particularly those from tract builders, and how it might be used to
appraise the adequacy (or inadequacy) of the price floors that
Wahoo Building Supply Company had temporarily instituted
shortly after his first report.
His report showed the following as the simple method for
determining either of the foregoing:
From the sales price (net of freight and cash discount), deduct
the variable cost of the products to be sold. Variable costs should
include:
1. Direct materials
2. Direct labor
3. Variable manufacturing, general and administration and sell
ing costs and expenses
He stated that direct material and labor costs were available and
seemingly accurate for the entire garage door line. The costs
should, of course, be adjusted for any changes in the future.
The CPA’s analysis of variable costs of the individual products
for the five-month period produced the following variable burden
rates as a percentage of direct labor:
Garage doors:
Budget m o d e l..................................
D e luxe m o d e l..................................
Custom m o d e l..................................
Accessories and miscellaneous................
Installation and serv ice..........................

145%
130%
135%
110%
80%

The report made it clear that the variable expense overhead rate
on accessories and miscellaneous items had only been computed
on a composite basis and that adequate information was not avail
able to determine adequately separate overhead rates for each
item. Use of the composite rate, in other words, could be dangerous
if a specific item actually incurred a good deal more variable over
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head than the average of all the items. Fortunately, the factory
manager had not been able to put his finger on any accessory or
miscellaneous items that “absorbed” significantly more, or less,
variable overhead than others.
The last step, therefore, in arriving at a contribution amount was
to compute the variable expense cost by use of the foregoing per
centages, add the material and labor, and subtract the total from
the selling price. The contribution to fixed expense, if then divided
by the selling price being considered, would produce a percentage
of contribution which could be evaluated for adequacy.
For example, assume it is believed that a tract builder will
accept an offer to sell him 400 de luxe model garage doors for
a price which—after deduction for applicable freight and cash
discounts if they are to be allowed—would net Wahoo $60 for
each door. This price would be considerably lower than the price
floor recently instituted for this model, but the size of the order
has obviously made it attractive to consider.
The variable costs of the de luxe model, including basic acces
sories, are estimated from the cost analysis to be:
Direct m aterial..................
Direct la b o r ......................
Direct variable expense . . .
Total variable c o s t............

$25.96
12.75
16.58 (12.75 X 130%)
$55.29

The contribution percentage to be realized from this sale can
be computed as:
Net sales (400 doors @ $60.00)..........
Variable cost (400 doors @ $55.29) ..
Contribution to fixed expense
and p r o f it........................................

$24,000
22,116

Contribution percentage....................

7.54%

$ 1,884

Should an offer be made at this price level? It must depend on
circumstances at the time which only management can evaluate.
If management bears in mind that a contribution percentage of
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29.79 per cent derived from the entire sales mix in the five months
ended May 31 was not adequate to make a profit, there is a distinct
question whether an order yielding a 7.54 per cent contribution
rate should be accepted, except in unusual circumstances. It is also
evident that a contribution of 7.54 per cent is lower by 9.68 per cent
than the average contribution rate derived from de luxe model
doors in the five months analyzed. This model which yielded a
contribution rate of 17.22 per cent was, at this rate, the lowest
contributor of the garage door line.
The above example was cited because it actually occurred as a
sale during the month of March. A production backlog existed at
the time. The decision to make this sale resulted in a contribution
of $1,884 to overhead which, during a period of idle capacity,
would conceivably be justified. However, if $6,300 of other sales,
on which the average contribution of 29.79 per cent could have
been realized, had been lost that month by virtue of producing for
this order, the bid should not have been made at the price of $60.
The CPA recommended that the price floors be re-evaluated im
mediately through use of this concept and that all future pricing
decisions on large special orders be made only after application of
this method in each circumstance.

Other matters included in report
T he remainder of the report was devoted to a few recommenda
tions relative to (1) the accounting changes that should be made
in order that the system could produce product-line income state
ments as well as the conventional “all products” statements, (2) a
review of the variable and fixed expenses which would have to be
made from time to time, (3) the pricing of inventories, which as
the CPA emphasized, were not now to be priced with inclusion of
the variable direct cost rates he had computed and shown in the
report. He explained that these rates included distribution, S & A
and other expenses not normally included in inventory burden but
on the other hand did not include elements of fixed overhead which
would have to be included in inventory valuation for financial
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statement and tax purposes and (4) cost reduction areas which the
CPA felt should be explored by the management of Wahoo.
The CPA was rather surprised to find that his report was under
stood far better than he had expected. The owners felt that the
CPA had, as one of them put it, “exploded the whole business wide
open.” The factory manager derived considerable pleasure from
reminding his bosses of his prior attempts to relate costs to prices.
He wanted more information from the workpapers on which he
and the CPA had spread the variable manufacturing costs. Victori
ous at last, he announced that his “next project” would be to see
what he could do about reducing his costs, now that he really knew
what they were.

Sum m ary o f illustration
P erhaps the principal beneficiary of the report will prove to be
the friendly lender. It may even be worth $75,000. Wahoo finally
broke even in August and September, after continued small losses
in June and July. It met its first installment of notes due under the
bankruptcy settlement in July. It is too early to determine if Wahoo
will show profits adequate to meet the remaining bankruptcy obli
gations and eventually repay the $75,000 loan. It can only be re
ported at this time that continual small monthly losses have been
stopped.
Wahoo has, since the CPA’s report, worked up formal sales fore
casts, has adopted a simple over-all budget system and has made
several revisions in its accounting system to effect further cost
controls. Time, and continued attention to the problem areas,
could produce good profits, according to the optimistic CPA.

Reference list fo r fu r th e r study
T he primary purpose of this bulletin has been to provide the
reader with a few ideas from the wide area of costs and cost con
trols that may profitably be utilized by smaller business clients.
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The bulletin has been confined to programmed cost reduction, cost
accounting and distribution costs. The reference list is likewise
confined to these areas. The CPA who wishes to study these sub
jects further or seeks specific reference to matters within these
areas should find the following books and articles helpful. If addi
tional material is required, members of the American Institute are
invited to utilize the resources of its library and the assistance of
its librarians.
Cost reduction and control techniques
1. Cost Reduction at W ork. Management Report No. 28, published by the
American Management Association, 1515 Broadway, New York 36, New
York. 1959.

An 84-page report of successful company practices in effecting
cost reduction and control. Among the specific approaches to pro
grammed cost reduction considered in the booklet are standardiza
tion, value analysis, work simplification and systems engineering.
Control of manufacturing costs is emphasized.
2. Control of Non-Manufacturing Costs. Management Report No. 26, pub
lished by the American Management Association, 1515 Broadway, New
York 36, New York. 1957. 128 pages.

A report of proven methods and techniques of reducing and
controlling expenses. In addition to three company studies in
volving control of office costs, the report contains an excellent
chapter on the values and uses of distribution cost analysis.
The report is oriented to big business; but the principles and
ideas advanced in it are, for the most part, applicable to small
businesses.
3. Management Aids for Small Manufacturers. Annual No. 5, published by
the Small Business Administration. 1959. Chapter 5, “Effective Control
for Better Management,” and Chapter 6, “Analyzing Your Cost of Market
ing.” Copies are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 45¢ per copy.

Chapter 5 gives down-to-earth ideas for devising a simple and
effective cost control system in a small business.
Chapter 6 provides the “basics” for determining and measuring
the effectiveness of the small business marketing dollar.
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This volume contains nine additional chapters, representing other
reprints of Management Aids issued by the SBA. The entire booklet
is worth reviewing—and perhaps sending to small business clients.
4. “Practical Cost Reduction Is Programmed Cost Reduction” by Rolfe Wyer.
N .A.A. Bulletin, November 1954.

This excellent article not only summarizes the "do’s” and "don’ts”
of successful cost reduction, but contains a detailed outline of the
items and areas to be programmed in a cost reduction plan for a
small or medium-sized company. It provides examples of special
cost reduction reports.
Cost accounting for cost control
1. Standard Costs by Clinton W. Bennett. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey. 1957. 450 pages of text, 50 pages of problems and
questions.

This excellent book comprehensively covers all aspects of stand
ard cost accounting. Its biggest value to the CPA lies in the fact
that the subject is approached from a management point of view.
While it adequately covers all the basic areas of standard cost
accounting, it emphasizes the management values of standard costs
and the relation of the cost system to the organization as a whole.
It is recommended primarily to the CPA who is already conversant
with basic cost accounting for either review or reference.
2. Theory and Technique o f Cost Accounting by Lawrence L. Vance. Henry
Holt and Company, Inc., 383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York.
1958. 530 pages.

An excellent basic text which provides up-to-date coverage of
all phases of cost accounting—including standard, process, job
order, joint and by-product cost methods. It devotes a full chapter
to direct costing techniques. While some coverage is provided to
management uses of cost accounting, the book is recommended
primarily for the CPA or staff member who wishes to review the
entire field of basic cost accounting. The questions and problems
which follow each chapter may assist in self study or in study
groups.
3. Cost Accountant’s Handbook, edited by Theodore Lang. The Ronald Press
Company, 15 East 26th Street, New York, New York. 1944. 1430 pages.
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This is the most complete reference book on all matters within
cost accounting—and a valuable addition to the library of any CPA
who deals with cost accounting systems or methods.
Distribution cost control
1. Distribution Costs by J. B. Heckert and R. B. Miner. The Ronald Press
Company, 15 East 26th Street, New York, New York. 1953. 380 pages.

A basic text written to aid accountants and marketing executives
in analyzing, supervising and controlling selling costs. An excellent
text for either a thorough study of the entire subject or as a refer
ence book for use in solving specific problems.
2. Practical Distribution Cost Analysis by D. R. Longman and M. Schiff.
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Illinois. 1955. 450 pages.

Another excellent volume for CPAs which provides coverage of
the entire subject of distribution costs. It stresses the analysis of
distribution costs and does not provide as much coverage of the
“marketing function” as Heckert’s and Miner’s book.
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